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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Russell Glenn Davis appeals from the district court's denial of his motion to
suppress evidence found during a search of his person.

In the district court, he

asserted that he was illegally detained near an apartment where a search was taking
place. He also asserted that he was illegally frisked, and that the officers conducting
the apartment search lacked probable cause to arrest him. The district court denied the
suppression motion because it found that Mr. Davis was sufficiently on the premises
being searched to detain him, and there was probable cause to arrest him.
Subsequently, Mr. Davis entered a conditional plea of guilty, preserving his right to
appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Davis argued that he was not in the immediate
vicinity of the premises being searched when he was detained by Air Force agents in
front of the apartment complex, and there was no nexus between Mr. Davis and the
activity giving rise to the search at the time of his detention. While the search was
taking place in an upstairs apartment of a quad-plex, he was detained on the ground
level, in front of the building. Therefore, he was not in the immediate vicinity of the
apartment being searched.
The State argues that because Officer Jessup, who was searching the upstairs
apartment, had confiscated an occupant's cell phone and intercepted text messages
from Mr. Davis, the collective knowledge doctrine applied to this situation. This is a
misunderstanding

of the

collective

knowledge

doctrine;

Officer Jessup never

communicated information about those texts to the Air Force agent in front of the
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apartment building who detained Mr. Davis.

Therefore, the agent who detained

Mr. Davis possessed no knowledge that could have provided him with reasonable
suspicion to detain Mr. Davis. Further, the agent received no directive from any other
law enforcement officer who possessed reasonable suspicion or probable cause, which
would have supported detaining Mr. Davis.
The State also argues that probable cause was established to arrest Mr. Davis
when he first approached the apartment complex, and, because there was probable
cause, the search of Mr. Davis was valid incident to his arrest.

This argument fails for

three reasons. First, the State continues to mistakenly rely on the collective knowledge
doctrine. Second, it conflates the district court's findings of fact. And third, although the
district court did not need to reach the issue of whether probable cause existed because
Mr. Davis's initial detention was illegal, the State fails to acknowledge that the district
court was correct when it found that probable cause to arrest and search Mr. Davis was
only established after Officer Jessup went downstairs to speak with Mr. Davis.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Davis's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUE
Whether the district court's denial of Mr. Davis's motion to suppress was error because
Mr. Davis was never in the immediate vicinity of the premises to be searched and there
was no nexus between Mr. Davis and the activity giving rise to the search at the time of
his detention.
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The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Davis's Motion To Suppress Because
Mr. Davis Was Never In The Immediate Vicinity Of The Premises To Be Searched And
There Was No Nexus Between Mr. Davis And The Activity Giving Rise To The Search
At The Time Of His Detention

Introd uctio n
Russell Davis entered a conditional plea of guilty to the charge of possession of a
controlled substance with the intent to deliver, preserving his right to challenge the
district court's order denying his Motion to Suppress. Mr. Davis asserts that the district
court erred in denying his Motion to
Amendment rights in that the
suspicion, much

probable

who

possessed no

criminal activity that would have allowed for a

legal detention of Mr. Davis.
The State's arguments to the contrary fail because the collective knowledge
doctrine did not apply here, and probable cause to arrest Mr. Davis was not established
until well after his initial, illegal detention.

B.

The State's Argument Regarding The Collective Knowledge Doctrine Fails
Because There Was No Communication From An Officer With Knowledge,
Which Is A Requirement Of The Doctrine
In response to Mr. Davis's argument that he was illegally detained by Agent

Shaiyah, the State argues that the collective knowledge doctrine applied in this
situation. (Resp. Br., pp.10-11.) It does not. Since the State properly recites the facts
of the case, its reliance on the doctrine appears to be a result of a misunderstanding of
the doctrine itself.
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The State cites to State v. Baxter, 144 Idaho 672, 678 (Ct. App. 2007), for the
rule that "[t]he totality of the circumstances known to police is measured by the
collective, not individual knowledge of the police." (Resp. Br., p.10.) This is obviously a
true statement, but the State fails to delve into the crucial elements of the collective
knowledge doctrine. Therefore, it makes the mistaken assumption that as long as one
officer possesses some knowledge about a suspect, that knowledge is automatically
imputed to all the other officers on scene. Indeed, the State fails to acknowledge that
there must be some type of communication, based on one officer's knowledge of facts
that establish reasonable suspicion or probable cause, which is first transmitted to
another officer in order for the doctrine to apply.
The Idaho Court of Appeals explained the parameters of the collective
knowledge doctrine in State v. Van Dorne, 139 Idaho 961 (Ct. App. 2004 ).

There, the

Court cited United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985), and said that "an officer who
makes an investigatory stop in reliance upon a report or bulletin from another law
enforcement officer or agency need not have personal knowledge of the facts that
underlay the report so long as the person who generated the report possessed the
requisite reasonable suspicion."

Van Dorne, 139 Idaho at 963 (citations omitted)

(emphasis added). The Court of Appeals went on to say that the Hensley Court
explained that the admissibility of evidence derived from the stop turns
not upon whether the officer who acted in reliance upon a report or
bulletin possessed reasonable suspicion, but on whether the officer who
issued the report or bulletin had knowledge of articulable facts supporting
a reasonable suspicion that the person to be stopped is or has been
involved in criminal activity.
Id.
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Thus the collective knowledge doctrine clearly depends on some sort of
communication taking place between officers; that communication can be indirect - in
the form of a bulletin for example - or direct, but it must occur. Here, there was no such
communication. There is nothing in the record indicating that Officer Jessup, when he
viewed the text messages from Mr. Davis, communicated to the agents below that they
should detain Mr. Davis if he arrived at the complex. The texts may have given Officer
Jessup reasonable suspicion, but Agent Shaiyah knew nothing about them or Mr. Davis.
In fact, when Agent Shaiyah detained Mr. Davis, he had no idea that Officer Jessup had
seen the texts, and no idea who Mr. Davis was or where he was headed.

Officer

Jessup, the only officer to have formulated a suspicion in his mind based on facts
available only to him, issued no report or bulletin to anyone.
reliance on the collective knowledge doctrine is misplaced.

Therefore, the State's
Agent Shaiyah detained

Mr. Davis illegally.

C.

The State's Other Arguments Fail As They Are Based On The Mistaken
Assumption That, Because The Collective Knowledge Doctrine Applied, The
Agents Downstairs Had Probable Cause To Detain Mr. Davis
The State's original mistake about the collective knowledge doctrine carries over

into its other arguments.

For example, the State says that when Agent Shaiyah

detained Mr. Davis, "the police had probable cause to arrest Davis, let alone detain him
for a few minutes to verify his identity and his connection with the apartments." (Resp.
Br., p.11.) The State bases this on a misreading of the facts as found in the district
court and a misunderstanding of the collective knowledge doctrine. It states that
Thus, the totality of the circumstances known to the police was as follows:
In a series of text messages, Davis agreed to deliver drugs to a resident of
apartment B202. Davis sent a text message to let the resident of the
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apartment 8202 know that he would be coming to the apartment soon.
Shortly after this text message was received, Davis arrived at the
apartment complex in his SUV. Davis emerged from the vehicle and
approached the apartment, carrying a bulge in of something in his pocket
Officers affirmatively identified Davis. That is sufficient evidence for police
to have probable cause to arrest Davis.
(Resp. Br. pp.8-9.) This is not true.

In order to reach this conclusion, the State

continues to depend on the mistaken idea that simply because Officer Jessup had
viewed the texts, the agents downstairs were presumed to know about them under the
collective knowledge doctrine. As made clear above, that is not the way the doctrine
works. Also, there was no finding in the district court that the agents saw a bulge in

Mr. Davis's pocket. Indeed, the district court made it clear that Officer Jessup was the
first one to notice the bulge. (R., p.52.) Therefore, the agents did not have reasonable
suspicion or probable cause to detain, arrest, or search Mr. Davis when he was stopped
by Agent Shaiyah.

And, while the district court did not need to reach the issue of

whether probable cause was established (because Mr. Davis's initial detention was
illegal), it was correct when it found that probable cause could not have been
established until after Officer Jessup left the apartment and went downstairs to question
Mr. Davis.
The State also repeats the district court's language to argue that Mr. Davis's
detention was legal.

It states that Mr. Davis was "sufficiently on the premises to be

detained for a few minutes .... " (Resp. Br., p.12.) And it relies on State v. Pierce, 137
Idaho 296 (Ct. App. 2002), for the proposition that "persons who arrive at the premises
during a search may be detained .... " (Resp. Br., p.12.) Again, the State correctly
recites the law but ignores the salient facts of this case that make that law irrelevant. As
argued in his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Davis had most certainly not arrived at the premises,
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nor was he in the immediate vicinity of the premises when he was detained. (See App.
Br., pp.10-11.) He had not even walked up the stairs. Therefore, it was impossible for
Agent Shaiyah to know who Mr. Davis was, or where he was going, at that point.
Finally, in response to Mr. Davis's argument that State v. Reynolds, 143 Idaho
911 (Ct. App. 2007), controlled this situation because, just as in Reynolds, Agent
Shaiyah had no knowledge of a connection between Mr. Davis and the criminal activity
that gave rise to the warrant, the State asserts that Reynolds "does not aid Davis's
argument." (Resp. Br., p.12.) It bases this assertion on the fact that Reynolds involved
a probation search.

(Resp. Br., p.12.)

But, as argued in the Appellant's Brief, the

Reynolds Court actually stated that "[e]ven if the officers had been conducting a search

pursuant to a warrant instead of a probation search, this Court's holding in Kester and

Pierce only authorized the detention of individuals found on the premises being
searched .... " (See App. Br., pp12-13.) Therefore, the Reynolds Court addressed the

State's argument here.
In this case, law enforcement did not, as the State asserts, have "probable cause
to arrest Davis, let alone detain him" when Agent Shaiyah stopped Mr. Davis. (Resp.
Br., p.13.)

Mr. Davis was not on the premises or in the immediate vicinity of the

premises, and Agent Shaiyah had no reason to detain him when he did. Therefore, the
detention was illegal, and the evidence collected after that detention must be
suppressed.
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CONCLUSION

Mr. Davis respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's judgment
of conviction and order of retained jurisdiction, reverse the order denying his motion to
suppress, and

this case to the district court for further proceedings.

DATED this 21 st day of January, 2015.

~ J. /;4--~-·----·(.--"----~-----REED P. ANDERSON/ ·._" 1
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 21 st day of January, 2015, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF, by causing to be placed a
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LYNN NORTON
DISTRICT JUDGE
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